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1.
Elon Musk, All Our Patent Are Belong to You, TESLA (June 12, 2014),
https://www.tesla.com/blog/all-our-patent-are-belong-you [https://perma.cc/37ZV-C348].
2. See Robert Ferris, Tesla Shares Drop After Posting Wider-Than-Expected Loss, CNBC
(Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/01/tesla-q3-2017-earnings.html [https://perma.cc
/LY4R-UCJP].
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In 2014, Elon Musk, the renowned and socially-minded CEO of Tesla
Motors, Inc., posted a blog on Tesla’s website that stated the company would
be freeing up many of its patents involved in the creation of the company’s
electric cars to any interested party.1 Yet again, Musk astounded the public by
choosing the betterment of society over corporate profits—stirring up a more
positive image than any other corporate personality. But there are numerous
questions that Musk’s positive PR have drowned out: Where can you access the
patents?; How did freeing up the patents get past the other executive officers
and the shareholders?; and Why even free up the patents in the first place? The
last question has the easiest answer on its face: for the betterment of mankind.
However, such an answer is doubtful to have swayed an entire board of
directors as well as any shareholder, and Tesla is not well known for turning a
profit.2 Tesla giving up its patents does not appear to be a reasonable business
decision, unless there was an ulterior motive for doing so; say, it would be
reasonable if Tesla did so to protect itself from something else.
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3. For example, Tesla now has no means of benefiting economically from those patents except
by indirect methods, such as other necessary, related patents.
4. 35 U.S.C. § 253(b) (2012).
5. See id.
6. In my research, there were no cases found that clearly outline this point. Much of my
research had to be extrapolated from relevant legislative comments and other discussions that were
occurring historically at the time of the language’s first inception.
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Indeed, by freeing up its patents, Tesla is able to avoid liability for possible
antitrust accusations down the line. How it manages to do this is not entirely
clear and may end up causing Tesla more headaches down the road,3 but one
avenue to this current situation, known as a “dedicat[ion] to the public,” is
found within the Patent Act.4 Located within the current section 253(b),
dedications to the public allow a patent-holder to relinquish their rights in a
patent in order to allow any third-party to utilize said patent and to avoid any
potential liability from having rights in the same.5 Doing so grants protections
to both patentees and patent-holders and may be considered to expand the prior
art for the betterment of all, dependent on your point of view. Regardless,
section 253(b) is one possible avenue that Tesla may have taken to give up its
patents under the guise of benevolence.
Again, there are the problems with gaining the votes of the board of
directors and keeping shareholders happy. In comes section 253(b), which,
instead of being used simply out of the goodness of a patent-holder’s heart, may
be used as a defense against antitrust prosecution. How a dedication to the
public can be used to prevent antitrust adjudication is not immediately clear
from the language of the statute, and unfortunately, there is no case law that
outlines how section 253(b) can be used to protect a patent-holder.6 Instead,
legislative intent is the lens through which we can determine the true purpose
of section 253(b) and dedication to the public at its inception. Additionally,
with the incredible expansion of many companies and embrace of vertical
integration tactics, a discussion of the shift from section 253(b)’s shift from
being an antitrust shield to an antitrust weapon for the benefit of a plaintiff is
relevant to show how dedication to the public should become more relevant
moving forward.
This comment will discuss these topics, beginning with an examination of
the language of the subsection as well as its changes through an examination of
legislative history. Part I will also include the historical relevance of the
antitrust discussion going on during the section’s birth. Next, Part II will
discuss how section 253(b) is used as an antitrust shield and whether it should
shift to become an antitrust remedy for plaintiffs instead. In that vein, Part II
will also discuss the current state of patent monopolies and the context of
contemporary society in determining the necessities of a legal shift.
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I. WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO DEDICATE TO THE PUBLIC?
A. The Language and History of Section 253(b)
The current language of section 253(b) reads as follows:
In the manner set forth in subsection (a), any patentee or applicant
may disclaim or dedicate to the public the entire term, or any
terminal part of the term, of the patent granted or to be granted.7
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7. 35 U.S.C. § 253(b). Note that subsection (a) is exclusively related to the doctrine of terminal
disclaimers and is not relevant to this discussion.
8. Search for 35 U.S.C. § 253(b) on Westlaw, then check the citing references tab and refine
the search for “dedication” or “dedicate.”
9. United States Patent Act, H.R. 3760, 82d Cong. § 203 (1951).
10. Id.
11. Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 253(b).
12. Id.; United States Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593 § 253, 66 Stat. 792, 809 (codified
as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 253 (1952)).
13. United States Patent Act, H.R. 9133, 81st Cong. § 203 (1950).
14. Id.
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The key language here is the portion related to dedication to the public.
Unfortunately, case law on this subject is very scarce and provides little
assistance in defining what this language means.8 Because of this scarcity,
defining section 253(b) requires an examination of the legislative history of
the statute and the few discussions left behind by politicians.
The dedication to the public language first originated in the House Bills
working up to the Patent Act of 1952.9 Specifically, in 1951 House Bill 3760,
section 203, relegated the language to a second paragraph (instead of a
subsection) that stated as follows: “In like manner any patentee or applicant
may disclaim or dedicate to the public the entire term, or any terminal part of
the term, of the patent granted or to be granted.”10 Again, “[i]n like manner”
references the paragraph above, which is related to the irrelevant terminal
disclaimer language.11 From this point forward, the language would remain
unchanged—the only alterations being the statute shifting from section 203 to
section 253 over the course of the statute’s creation and into the statute’s life.12
However, prior to the language’s initial inclusion in House Bill 3760, there
was one prior House Bill that did not include the dedication to the public
language—House Bill 9133.13 House Bill 9133 does include section 203, but
the second paragraph that included the relevant language was absent.14 What
caused the change is outlined in the Report from the Committee on the Judiciary
House of Representatives that accompanied House Bill 7794, which stated the
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following:
There is now a provision in the statute under which an invalid claim
must be disclaimed without unreasonable delay in order to save the
rest of the patent. [I]f one claim of a patent is invalid, the patentee
may take it out. He may sue on the remaining claims which have
whatever validity they may have on their own merits.15
It appears the drafters desired to leave an option for patent-holders to drop
a portion of their patent in haste should the holder expect a challenge to a
portion of the patent’s validity. Litigation can be costly, and to have an easy
out to avoid a court challenge could feasibly promote greater interest in
patenting. P.J. Frederico gave the following commentary on why this section
was added:
No specific reason for this provision appears in the printed record,
but its proponents contemplated that it might be effective in some
instances, in combatting a defense of double patenting, to permit the
patentee to cut back the term of a later issued patent so as to expire at
the same time as the earlier issued patent and thus eliminate any
charge of extension of monopoly.16
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15. H.R. REP. NO. 82–1923, at 8 (1952).
16. P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 1, 49 (1954).
17. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
§ 804 (2018),
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s804.html [https://perma.cc/2JLM-QGT4].
18. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29 § 253, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
19. Search 253 on Westlaw citation references for “253(b)” and only one case will appear.
This case is not about dedication to the public but instead concerns terminal disclaimers.
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Extending the monopoly would mean that, if an earlier patent existed as a
part of a newer patent—thus continuing the limited monopoly right—the
patent-holder would hold monopoly rights over the older patent past the
expiration date. This problem is known as double patenting and would be an
issue in these scenarios, as it would mean the newer patent would essentially
cover both the greater invention and any lesser parts that had been previously
patented.17 Therefore, the intent of including the language for dedication to the
public would assumedly be to prevent unrestricted patent continuations that
would allow for an unlimited patent period.
The language of the second paragraph of section 253 survived into the
current Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), passed in 2011.18 Since its
passage to its current state in section 253(b), dedication to the public has not
been challenged in the judicial system or further defined by many, if any,
judges.19 With the case law being so scarce, the average scholar would assume
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that section 253(b) is unused or nonthreatening to any party involved in a
double-patenting scenario, but that simply seems unrealistic, given how
confrontational the American legal system is designed. Much more likely,
section 253(b) is used as a tool before issues arise to avoid challenges by
possible licensees. Indeed, as will be discussed below, the history surrounding
the passage of the Patent Act of 1952 will illustrate how this can be the case.
B. Antitrust
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20. David Hess, Chicago School of Economics, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (June 6, 2017),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Chicago-school-of-economics [https://perma.cc/Z992-F9Z9].
21.
See Lanny Ebenstein, Going Off the Rails, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 22, 2015),
https://www.economist.com/news/books-and-arts/21676745-how-libertarians-hijacked-liberaleconomics-going-rails [https://perma.cc/6UXX-B5QR].
22. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION,§ 1:6
(4th ed. 1996).
23. See id.
24. WALTER ADAMS & JAMES W. BROCK, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS ON T RIAL :A DIALOGUE
ON THE NEW LAISSEZ-FAIRE 4 (1991).
25. Id. at 5.
26. Id. at 25.
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Founded in the 1930s, the Chicago School of Economics quickly rose to
prominence in economic circles by producing numerous Nobel Prize winners.20
Though initially proponents of more liberal economic ideas from the era of the
Great Depression, Chicago School thinkers began moving toward more
libertarian policies of laissez-faire market solutions.21 These new policies
reject “non-economic social goals and posit[] economic analysis as the major
or sole criterion for government intervention.”22 Essentially, Chicago
Economists argue in favor of a free market in order to find solutions to society’s
problems and stand against government intervention at all times, except in
extreme circumstances.23
One method of making free market determinations to solve societal
problems is termed “price theory,” which “is the science explaining rational
economic behavior and the operation of markets.”24 According to Chicago
School economists, price theory can be used to make the rational determination
in a cost-benefit analysis of any given situation, including crime, divorce,
having children, etc.25 Chicago School economists can also make these
analyses with antitrust considerations; they argue that monopolies can be a
maximization of consumer welfare.26 If a single firm dominates a market, the
market can still be efficient as the firm will need to maintain competitive
pricing in order to maintain their monopoly—thus, the monopoly remains the
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27. Id.
28. See id. at 19–20.
29. See id. at 22–23.
30. General Information Concerning Patents—What Are Patents, Trademarks, Servicemarks,
and Copyrights? U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (Oct. 2015), https://www.uspto.gov/patentsgetting-started/general-information-concerning-patents#heading-2 [https://perma.cc/LA97-LTP5].
31. Id.
32. See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Expansion of Overlapping Intellectual Property
Rights, IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/02/22/the-expansion-ofoverlapping-intellectual-property-rights/id=15369/ [https://perma.cc/8WL2-FAHW].
33. Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Scope, 57 W M .& MARY L. REV. 2197, 2200 (2016).
34. Zack Kanter, Why Amazon is Eating the World, TECHCRUNCH (May 14, 2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/05/14/why-amazon-is-eating-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/5WDD-J885].
35. Morton Salt Co v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491 (1942). Morton Salt was abrogated

40672-mqi_22-1 Sheet No. 80 Side B

most efficient form for the consumer.27 Any intervention from the government
would merely harm the markets, as the intervention creates the threat of
political-economic collusion that hampers free markets through a restriction of
consumer choice and thereby ruining efficiency in the market for said
consumers.28 Only in the advent of collusion monopolies that restrict efficiency
should governments get involved with antitrust.29
Unfortunately for the free market idealist, the government is involved in the
marketplace in various forms, one such form being patents. Patents are limited
monopolies that grant the owner an exclusive right to the creation, sale, or
licensure of their patent, given by the United States Patent Office (USPTO).30
This right is essentially a limited monopoly over the invention, granting the
holder the right to exclude others as they could under other forms of property
rights.31 What originally began as a right to protect commercial products from
thieving competitors has now evolved into an all-consuming right in the hands
of certain parties to control who can create what and where by restricting
licensing.32 The reason for such an expansion is obvious: a right holder would
prefer his right to be construed as broadly as possible in order to maintain
their monopolistic dominance,33 but there are broader legal ramifications of
the slow creep of rights expansion. Of course, there are protections against
gross abuse of a right via laws against patent extension, but with the growth of
companies like Amazon where vertical integration becomes the norm,34 one
parent company can hold hundreds of subsidiaries, which hold thousands
more patents. At some point, courts must be wary of the sheer size of these
companies when examining cases involving their patent rights.
Patent extension and double-patenting fall generally under the doctrine of
patent misuse. The United States Supreme Court established the doctrine of
patent misuse in the case Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co.35 The
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respondent in this case owned a machine which required a specific type of salt
tablet to use, and the company required any licensees of the machine to contract
to only purchase those specific tablets.36 The petitioner, a competitor, allegedly
infringed on the respondent’s patent,37 but the Court determined the following:
Where the patent is used as a means of restraining competition with the
patentee’s sale of an unpatented product, the successful prosecution of
an infringement suit even against one who is not a competitor in such
sale is a powerful aid to the maintenance of the attempted monopoly of
the unpatented article and is thus a contributing factor in thwarting the
public policy underlying the grant of the patent. Maintenance and
enlargement of the attempted monopoly of the unpatented article are
dependent to some extent upon persuading the public of the validity of
the patent, which the infringement suit is intended to establish.38
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by the Supreme Court in Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006), but
this does not detract my point as Morton Salt is still the case wherein double patenting as doctrine was
established.
36. Id. at 490.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 493.
39. Id. at 490.
40. Id. at 494.
41. See United States v. General Electric Co., 115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953).
42. Id. at 844.
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To use the patent to cover something unpatented by a contract that binds
the patented and unpatented materials together would prevent any opportunities
of prosecuting infringement, as the respondent did here, by forcing licensees to
contract for the salt tablets as well as the machine and inserting clauses limiting
the licensor’s liability.39 If, instead, the respondent had not forced licensees to
contract for the tablet, but attempted to remain competitive by keeping its
tablet prices the lowest, then this suit likely could have moved forward against
the infringer. Unfortunately for the respondent, that hypothetical situation did
not occur, and thus the Court found that the respondent had unlawfully
extended their patent.40
Another case that established patent misuse principles was United States v.
General Electric Co.41 In this case, the respondent attempted to extend its
patents over lamp parts to control the lamp-making industry.42 Unlike Morton
Salt, the respondent here was not attempting to unlawfully extend its patents
but instead possessed “an arsenal of a huge body of patents that [could] easily
overwhelm and defeat competition by small firms desiring to stay in or
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gain a foothold in the industry.”43 The Court was thus forced to impose an
extreme remedy to protect the market, and required the respondent to dedicate
some of its patents.44 Such a conclusion was unavoidable because of the
respondent’s overwhelming market presence quashed competition by smaller
firms.45 Though not explicitly stated to come from section 253(b) in the
opinion, the Court used dedication as a means to protect competition in a
monopolized market where no other solution was viable.
Lastly, in Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, the District Court found
that some firms must be allowed to continue licensure control if it is the firm’s
only means of generating income.46 In Hartford-Empire, the defendant—a
company that produced glass-making machinery—had restricted competition
in the market over a specific piece of the greater glass-making tool known as
the “gob feeder.”47 By controlling the vast majority of the market of gobfeeders, the defendant created a substantial entry barrier for any party that could
not pay its licensing fees and thus stifled competition.48 However, the Supreme
Court did not force dedication upon the petitioner because Congress never
built patent cancellation into the law as a method of combating antitrust—
despite numerous opportunities to do so.49 The Court could not decide whether
to destroy a patent right on its own, as it would hamper the entire patent
system in place.50 Therefore, the remedy had to be reasonable royalties limited
exclusively to certain patents and not the destruction of the patent right
altogether.51
II. ANTITRUST SHIELD OR ANTITRUST REMEDY
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43. Id.
44. Id. at 843.
45. Id. at 844.
46. See United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 46 F. Supp. 541, 593–94 (D. Ohio 1942).
47. See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1945).
48. Id. at 394.
49. Id. at 416–17.
50. See id. at 415.
51. Id. at 420.
52. See Lawrence Schlam, Compulsory Royalty-Free Licensing as an Antitrust Remedy for
Patent Fraud: Law, Policy and the Patent-Antitrust Interface Revisited, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
467, 509 (1998).
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Though only one case above directly used dedication as a remedy, each is
relevant in the discussion of how dedication has been used and how it can be
used moving forward. Courts have been extremely hesitant to use dedication
as an antitrust remedy, as evidenced by the cases above, due to the confiscatory
nature of dedication as a remedy.52 An example of the judicial branch’s
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53. Hartford-Empire Co., 323 U.S. at 393–94.
54. Louis Kaplow, Antitrust, Law & Economics, & the Courts, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
181, 181 (1987).
55. Frederico, supra note 16.
56. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System: A Reexamination, 76 OHIO ST. L.J.
467, 473–74 (2015).
57. See Senator Elizabeth Warren, Reigniting Competition in the American Economy, Keynote
Remarks at America’s Open Market Programs Event, 2 (June 29, 2016).
58. Id.
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hesitancy can be seen in Hartford-Empire, wherein the Court did not wish to
apply dedication as it would harm the market.53 Courts, in general, seek to
apply Chicago School of Economics principles when determining issues
surrounding patents, as removing the protection of a patent has the possibility
of harming the free market by damaging a major player within that specific
market.54 In the converse, dedication could exist as an antitrust shield that
protects large entities from possible patent misuse allegations by allowing
them to free up a minor part of a patent in order to uphold the greater patent.
The basis for such an argument is within the history of section 253(b) itself,
with the discussion of dedication as a protection from double-patenting.55
Under such a paradigm, dedication would be used exclusively by the patentholder to defend against the dangers of unlawfully extending a patent. Section
253(b) would allow a patent-holder to dedicate the remainder of a new patent,
rather than attaching an older patent to the newer one. By so doing, not only is
double-patenting avoided, but the patent-holder is able to avoid any liability.
Therefore, Congress’ intent was clearly to use dedication to the public as an
antitrust shield on behalf of patent-holders.
Dedication as an antitrust shield became even more relevant as time went
on, particularly beginning in the 1970s when patent law began to slowly expand
past what antitrust laws were meant to protect against.56 With the rampant
growth of economic power in the hands of a few, large companies, fewer
outsiders are able to challenge the holdings of these companies and prevent
integration on both the vertical and horizontal levels.57 Especially in the
technology sector, larger companies hold incredible power over the smaller
ones—with important software and hardware being locked behind expensive
patents or the patent itself being used to direct traffic away from smaller
competitors.58 Any one of these large tech companies can be protected by large
legal teams identifying possible antitrust threats within its extensive chains of
patents and then choosing to dedicate any number of lesser patents in order to
avoid expensive legal battles.
Indeed, the likelihood of Tesla doing this is high, especially as the company
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59. Solar Panels FAQs, TESLA (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.tesla.com/support/solar/solarpanels-faqs [https://perma.cc/H3ES-SHCD].
60. Model 3, TESLA, https://www.tesla.com/model3 [https://perma.cc/LJ96-GW3R] (last
visited Feb. 1, 2018).
61. Danielle Muoio, Here’s Everything Tesla is Working on Right Now, BUSINESS INSIDER
(Sept. 9, 2017, 9:37 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/tesla-projects-long-term-plans-20179/#tesla-may-also-add-a-dashcam-to-its-future-vehicles-12 [https://perma.cc/F74Z-VDXG].
62. See generally Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 363 (1965).
63.
See id. at 366–67.
64.
Id. at 368.
65.
Patent Trolls, Electronic Frontier Foundation (May 1, 2017, 1:09 PM),
https://www.eff.org/issues/resources-patent-troll-victims [https://perma.cc/TYB2-NHAP].
66. Hovenkamp, supra note 57, at 480–81.
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begins to expand its market reach into solar panels,59 more advanced forms of
electric car,60 and other interrelated technology.61 The idea that corporate
shareholders or board members would be okay with simply freeing up all of
Tesla’s patents without any monetary gain is laughable. Instead, the company
is likely doing so in order to avoid potential liability when it begins to license
out other patents that may possess parts from the freed patents—thereby
avoiding any allegations of patent extension. In so doing, Tesla is able to
simultaneously render the issue of patent extension moot as well as drum up a
positive public image.
Allowing dedication to exist as a shield, as well as current jurisprudence
over patent misuse, is indicative of greater policy with regard to antitrust that
harms competition rather than fosters it.62 Such policies give firms the ability
to create a network of patent rights that do not explicitly require an unpatented
product but can require said unpatented product from another party—a party
that may be engaging in price fixing with the original patent holder.63 At the
same time, the idea of incipiency comes into play, which is when a company
begins to approach antitrust-level proportions but has not yet reached them,
thus safeguarding them in courts due to the companies being considered “more
efficient.”64 Allowing for these practices gives incentive to “patent troll” firms,
which can obtain wide swaths of patents exclusively for the use of harming
competitors or other players in the market.65 Indeed, once the patent exists in
the market, there is little to no oversight for where these rights end up and
who is controlling them.66 Arguably, the market can be controlled by a handful
of patent troll firms with selectively owned patents that charge prices that block
smaller competitors or keep control in the hands of larger parent corporations.
Once that control is established, any threat to a troll firm’s control can be
handled by picking some lesser patents to dedicate, thereby protecting control.
Amongst those within innovative communities, there is a relative consensus
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67. Id. at 558.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 558–59.
70. Id. at 560.
71. Id.
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that patent trolls (entities that accumulate patents in order to make money off
of them exclusively) are hampering innovation by filing approximately 60% of
all infringement litigation.67 Part of the problem is that these trolls are bringing
infringement suits over possibly obvious patents, as many of the suits are
brought against the actual inventor.68 Unfortunately for these companies,
patent infringement is strict liability, and thus, no matter the extent to which the
company actually uses the allegedly infringed patent, the company generally
must pay.69 Such activities are a clear abuse of the patent system; they extend
the patent right beyond a right to exclude by allowing troll firms to completely
control even patents that may be considered obvious—thus eliminating any
defense from companies.
Instead of allowing dedication to the public to exist as an antitrust shield,
courts should look to dedication as an antitrust remedy. Though there are
numerous barriers to overcome to apply antitrust law to these situations,70
there already exists a possible solution in section 253(b). Dedication to the
public can be an effective doctrine to circumvent the barriers to antitrust law,
as section 253(b) exists directly in the Patent Act. In effect, when a patent troll
brings a suit against a technology firm for a possibly obvious patent, the
technology company could attempt to counterclaim that the lawsuit is
frivolous and aim for a remedy of dedication. If the patent is provably
obvious, then the patent troll should not retain those rights. Even in situations
where obviousness is not totally provable, if the firm can be shown to exist as
a patent troll, then a similar solution should be applied. Antitrust has
difficulties of being applied to patent trolls due to their nature as non-producers,
meaning they only aggregate rights and do not create anything themselves.71
However, that does not mean patent trolls cannot be used to control the market.
Courts should be allowed to pierce the corporate veil if a larger parent owns
the troll or if there is evidence that the troll is hampering the market then the
court should be allowed to punish these unlawful allocations of control.
Dedication is the most readily available method for this because if dedication
is allowed as a remedy then these firms will break themselves up as they can
no longer control markets. The existence of trolls alone shows a failure of the
market and a failure of the patent system, therefore indicating a need for
dedication to the public to mesh with antitrust law to promote competition.
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The judicial system needs to be more mindful of what the patent monopoly
should be in relation to rulings. The largest companies in America today are
capable of expanding their market control simply through vertical and
horizontal integration tactics.72 Such aggressive expansions equate to
concentrations of wealth in a handful of shadowy parent corporations73 and can
effectively allow these corporations to control the market of patent licenses
indirectly. Rising in importance again should be the judicial policies of trustbusting from the early 1900s with courts becoming more worried about
concentrations of patent monopolies in the hands of the few, whether directly
or indirectly.74
Chicago School economists would likely argue against such policies as
damaging competition—after all, monopolies are merely an outcome of high
efficiency.75 The proof against such an assertion is visible in today’s society,
as companies like Amazon are able to lock out competitors due to their control
of keystone markets.76 For example, when Amazon released its Kindle ereader, the company “decided to price bestseller e-books at $9.99, significantly
below the $12 to $30 that a new hardback typically costs [Amazon’s] plan
was to dominate the e-book selling business in the way that Apple had become
the go-to platform for digital music. The strategy worked[.]”77 From actions
like this, it is not difficult to extrapolate how Amazon can easily dominate
competitors. Indeed, due to vertical integration, Amazon is fully capable of
never needing to sell its licenses to competitors; instead, many competitors find
it necessary to use Amazon’s systems to market their products.78
The above examples are not exclusively indicative of patent abuse alone,
but they do show how utilizing patents in an anticompetitive manner can
damage the greater market. In fact, situations like those just described are not
uncommon.79 Unfortunately, courts have a tendency to rule in favor of strong
patent protections over market ones.80 Such cases are difficult to decide, as the
court must weigh the patent-holder’s right to exclude against any alleged
antitrust acts the holder may be committing. Because of the holder’s right to
exclude, many scholars would argue that there is no antitrust violations so long
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as the holder is not using their right to illegally misuse their patent.81 However,
holding so strictly to the patent holder’s right to exclude others is a dangerous
path to tread, as larger companies are fully capable of trouncing that line by
refusing licensure selectively, or—specifically to internet-related
businesses82—by using their patents to exclude others from the market
altogether. Chicago School economists would argue that these businesses’
increased efficiency led them to dominate the markets. But companies like
Google are currently capable of dominating the market simply by barring any
and all entry83—efficiency is no longer required. A shift in judicial policy away
from protecting these corporate giants must be considered, as a market failure
currently exists where these same giants can control not only the production
and sale of goods but also the flow of information. Dedication to the public
must be considered as a remedy to this problem, particularly where a few
companies have so much accumulated power that both the consumer and
competitors cannot challenge these companies’ market dominance.
III. CONCLUSION
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Elon Musk likely had pure intentions when he was freeing up his patents,
but that does not mean ulterior motives did not also exist within the board of
directors and prominent shareholders. Musk himself likely had knowledge of
the boons of avoiding antitrust and saw the situation as a win-win. Either way,
Tesla’s actions show an act in line with the historically intended use of
dedication to the public. However, considering the increased allocations of
power in fewer corporations, should such a use be continued? Courts should
be wary of allowing any sort of monopoly, and that includes the patent right.
The patent right must be returned to its original, intended use of limiting the
holder’s right only to exclusion. The current expansion of patent rights has
allowed these large corporations to essentially control the markets by not only
refusing licenses but also by using their patents to dominate markets and
exclude competitors. The Chicago School of thought must be removed from
jurisprudence in order to rebalance competition in our current age of
monopolistic dominance, and dedication to the public can be the avenue to
achieve that in both doctrine and policy.
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